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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-AsSUMPTION OF DUTY OF
DuE CARE.-Deceased was killed by a fall from an elevated train
when the train pulled out of a station while he was hanging by his
hands from stanchions on the outside of the train platform. In view
of the helpless drunken condition of the deceased, the respondent was
under a duty to see to the welfare of the man. A primna facie case
was made out by the appellant when he showed respondent's failure
to exercise due care in letting a helplessly intoxicated fare on the
train. The judgment of the Trial Term, affirmed by the Appellate
Division, dismissed the complaint, denying the appellant's right to
the doctrine of last clear chance since the conductor's uncontradicted
testimony brought forth the facts that the train was moving and that
he had immediately employed every means to stop its motion. Held,
judgment reversed. Whether or not the respondent could have done
something more to avert this tragedy and whether failure to act in
time was the proximate cause of death were jury questions, hence it
was error to dismiss the complaint. Elliot v. The New York Rapid
Transit Corporation., 293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. (2d) 86 (1944).
When the deceased entered the train from which he fell to his
death, the respondent assumed a duty of more than ordinary care
since the deceased was helplessly drunk (a condition which was ap-
parent to the conductor). Therefore the respondent was under a
duty to make an explanation of the appellant's death to the court. In
cases I where there is no special duty resting upon the defendant to
protect the plaintiff from the results of his own intoxication, the fact
that the plaintiff was intoxicated, if it is a contributing cause of the
injury, is a bar to the action. But this rule is modified in cases 2
where a defendant, like a common carrier, owes to a passenger plain-
tiff a special duty to protect him because of the fact that he is intoxi-
cated. The care which a common carrier is bound to exercise to
safeguard the drunken man would be dictated by his known condition
and the situation as a whole. The fact that the condition is self-
imposed does not mitigate the duty. A common carrier also assumes
a duty of due care in the case of a sick or disabled passenger for hire.
There are many decisions 3 in which the duty toward a sick or dis-
one, plaintiff could recover if his negligence was slight and that of the defen-
dant was gross in comparison. Under the other the negligence of both plaintiff
and defendant were to be compared, not for the purpose of relieving one of
liability or denying the other a right to recover but for the purpose of reducing
the amount of plaintiff's damages according to the extent which his own negli-
gence contributed to the injury. See LIABILITY OF CARRIERS (2d ed. 1929)
§ 852. The United States Supreme Court has adopted the second theory in all
actions under the federal statute.
1 Fardette v. N. Y. & Stamford R. R. Co., 190 App. Div. 543, 180 N. Y.
Supp. 179 (1920).2 Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 220 N. Y. 301, 115 N. E. 704
(1917).
3 O'Hanlon v. Murray, 285 N. Y. 321, 34 N. E. (2d) 339 (1941) ; Buckley
v. Hudson Valley Ry. Co., 212 N. Y. 440, 106 N. E. 121 (1914).
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RECENT DECISIONS
abled person is the same as the duty to an intoxicated person.
The appellant also made out a case grounded on the doctrine of
last clear chance. The learned judge in the Trial Term should have
charged as Chief Justice Pound suggested in the case of Storr v.
N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,4 that the doctrine is never wakened into
action unless and until there is brought home to the defendant to be
charged with liability, knowledge that another or his property is in a
state of present peril, in which event there must be a reasonable effort
to counteract the peril and avert its consequences. 5 If one by a negli-
gent act places himself or his property in a position of danger, his
negligence does not contribute to defeat his recovery if the situation
was known to the defendant in time to avert the consequence of the
plaintiff's own negligence. In such a case the defendant's negligence
is the sole cause of the injury. It must not run on "inert and callous"
and cause an accident which proper care might have avoided. Knowl-
edge may be established by circumstantial evidence, in the face even
of professions of ignorance,0 but knowledge there must be, or negli-
gence so reckless as to betoken indifference to knowledge. This doc-
trine of last clear chance, as set forth in many states, really means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a posi-
tion of peril, yet if another acts or omits to act with knowledge of the
peril and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recover.7
M. A. H.
NEGLIGENCE-MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY FROM
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS ARTICLE.-While wearing an evening gown
with a glazed double-netted skirt manufactured by the defendant, the
plaintiff was seriously injured when the netting of her dress ignited,
instantly enveloping her in flames. The plaintiff's proof tended to
show that the netting was treated with an explosive substance (nitro-
cellulose sizing) that rendered it inherently dangerous for the purpose
for which it was intended. From a judgment of the trial court grant-
ing the defendant's motion to set aside a plaintiff's verdict and for a
directed verdict on the ground that there was a deficiency in the
proof that the dress as manufactured and delivered was inherently
dangerous, the plaintiff appeals. Held, judgment reversed. The de-
fendant manufacturer did not adduce any evidence to show the nature
of the sizing used in the dress. The jury could properly take most
4261 N. Y. 348, 185 N. E. 407 (1933).
5 Panarese v. Union Ry. Co., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933); Wolo-
szynowski v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471 (1930).
6 Bragg v. Central New England Ry. Co., 228 N. Y. 54, 126 N. E. 253
(1920).
7 Chunn v. Washington City & Suburban Ry., 207 U. S. 302, 28 Sup. Ct.
63 (1907) ; Green v. Los Angeles Terminal R. F_ Co., 143 Cal. 31, 76 Pac. 719
(1903).
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